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Purpose: This study aims to theoretically explore and examine the possibility of developing an 
Islamic Social Welfare Function (ISWF) within the Islamic Moral Economy (IME) frame by 
going beyond the traditional fiqhi approach. It focuses on issues of preference ordering and 
utility through the normative dimension of Islamic ontology, as expressed and articulated 
within the IME 
Design/methodology/approach: Being a theoretical paper, a conceptual and critical discursive 
approach is utilised in this paper. 
Findings: To establish an ISWF, a narrow juristic approach remains inadequate; there is a need 
to integrate the substantive morality to complement the juristic approach to achieve the ihsani 
process as the ultimate individual objective, which makes an ISWF possible. Since the scattered 
debate on the topic concentrates mainly on the juristic approach, the main contribution of this 
study is to present a model in which juristic and moralist positions endogenized and augmented 
to constitute ISWF. 
Originality: Since there is a limited amount of research is available on the subject matter, this 
paper will be an important theoretical contribution. In addition, this study develops an IME 
approach rather than fiqh based approach utilised in the available research, which makes it 
novel. 
Keywords: Social welfare function; Islamic moral economy; Islamic social welfare function; Islamic 
substantive morality; Islamic juristic approach 
 
Asutay, M. & Yilmaz, I. (2021) Constituting an Islamic Social Welfare Function: An Exploration through Islamic 




1. Introduction  
The wealth generation and distribution related issues — such as shared prosperity, the 
sustainable development goals, environmental-social-governance (ESG), and participatory 
governance — have become an important part of the post-financial crisis debate by various 
circles including international development agencies. A fundamental aspect of shared 
prosperity—and other similar aspirations—goes beyond the economy and relates to the 
underlying social contract. The social contract practiced in each society is based on a particular 
conceptualization of social welfare that corresponds to the public policy choices in that society 
that define the possibility of shared prosperity and peace in society. The nature and construct 
of social welfare should be defined so that shared prosperity and sustainability issues can be 
articulated on a robust ground, beyond pragmatist attempts. An equitable, just, and human-
centred world system, functioning both within and across generations, needs to be developed 
and embedded, either by the proper generation and inculcation of rules or through the 
facilitation of civil society, which requires a systemic and integrated political economy 
approach. 
As regards to the prevailing paradigm of neoclassical economics, its assumptions does not 
allow actualisation of social welfare, as the methodological framework of neoclassical 
economics rests on a paradigm of human “egoism, rationality, self-interest and utility 
maximization” (Mueller 1989: 2). Accordingly, all institutions in society are operated with the 
explicit approval of the market system, which lets the price mechanism rule and decides how, 
when, and for whom to produce. Since the efficiency of the market is taken as given, prices are 
assumed to precisely reflect individuals’ desires and constrain their choices. No substantial 
morality is involved in the model—except voluntarily selected moral considerations—since all 
movements across institutions are left to the mercy of the price mechanism to be just, equal, 
and efficient. Therefore, a social welfare function (henceforth, SWF) designed within such a 
paradigm is not necessarily sufficient to provide a comprehensive understanding of social 
reality because of its value-free nature and over-emphasis on self-regulation and neutrality.  
The conceptual definition of social welfare in conventional economics has its roots in some 
liberal value judgments; hence different concepts of social welfare statements have been 
derived from various liberal perspectives (among others see: Sugden, 1981; Rowley and 
Peacock, 1975; Nozick, 1974; and Rawls, 1972). The basic ones are “individualism, pluralism 
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of values, the importance of rights, and equality” (Sugden, 1981: 10-11). The liberal 
perspective, in this context, necessarily requires the maximization of the SWF through the tools 
of economics. In an expanded definition, the SWF “should be seen as a statistical ‘aggregator’ 
that turns a distribution into a single number that provides an overall judgment on that 
distribution and that forces us to think coherently about welfare and its distribution” (Deaton, 
1997: 135). 
In reflecting, the four types of SWFs, namely Bergson-Samuelson (1954), Harsanyi (1955), 
Arrow (1963), and Rawls (1972) under neoclassical economics, are all derived from the 
Western ontology; hence rationality, a liberal-secular world view, capitalistic ideals, 
unconstrained individual freedom, and self-maximizing behaviour constitute the 
epistemological bases of these SWFs. A paradigm shift is, therefore, needed to  allow a well-
functioning and just social welfare model. Therefore, an endogenization process is 
indispensable to include the interests of all stakeholders in such an equation. Conventional 
economics has not been able to embark on this process yet; contrarily, the consequences of the 
market economy keep continuing to undermine the moral fabric of society (Hirsch, 1976). 
Public choice economists have endeavoured to answer the question, “how [can] political 
institutions and rules be designed in a manner which will direct the self-interest of political 
players to the furtherance of the general welfare” (Wagner and Gwartney, 2004: 14). Unlike 
the neoclassical creed, which favours the “market process” to explain and describe the 
behaviour of the so-called homoeconomicus, public choice economists prefer the “political 
process” to study this behaviour (Wagner and Gwartney, 2004: 5). The main distinction here 
is that neoclassical economists stress the importance of physical constraints of nature, which 
individuals and states are always subject to, while a public choice approach focuses on 
institutions that shape and occasionally constrain individuals’ choices and behaviour (Brennan 
and Buchanan, 2000). Although the latter approach incorporates nonmarket sources of 
individual behaviour into its model, its ontological and epistemological roots—which are in 
line with neoclassical postulates—do not permit a comprehensive understanding of the SWF. 
In response to socioeconomic inequalities and injustices, religions have also cognitively 
instituted economic systems, which prevailed for many centuries before the modern era. The 
economic system developed through the cognitive knowledge system of Islam adopts the 
perspective of a moral economy to rectify the failures of the market economy. The Islamic 
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Moral Economy (henceforth IME), with its distinctive values and norms, evaluates economic 
activities primarily by way of reference to the tenets of the Qur’ān and Sunnah. By conforming 
to these tenets, people reach falāḥ (salvation) in this world and the akhirah (hereafter). The 
falāḥ process, enhanced with iḥsāni (equilibrium-oriented benevolence) social capital, can play 
a pivotal role in the construction of an Islamic SWF (henceforth ISWF); as ihsan, as a quality 
and attitude, provides the basis for sharing economy. 
IME is guided by a multidimensional approach to welfare and development issues, which 
“regards individual and social welfare as complementary rather than competitive and 
antagonistic. It, therefore, encourages cooperation instead of competition and rivalry; and 
develops an intimate relationship between individuals” (ur-Rahman, 1974: 33). Thus, several 
normative and ethical foundational axioms are derived from IME in constructing ISWF. These 
extend beyond fiqhī (the Islamic legal and form-based) approach and constitute the operating 
tools of the falāḥ process. The main foundational axioms as the IME’s epistemological roots 
that form the falāḥ process are tawhid (unity), al‘adl wal iḥsān (justice and equilibrium),  farḍ 
(responsibility), and ikhtiyār (free will) (Naqvi, 1994: 26-29).  
The precepts of the IME express the essence of the notion of shared prosperity, as well as 
incorporating various social and moral factors that determine economic and financial decisions. 
However, the practice in the Muslim world and the realm of Islamic finance in the past forty 
years has contrasted sharply with these precepts. Therefore, at least a theoretical attempt should 
be made to constitute the potential nature of an ISWF, define its underlying assumptions, and 
its expression in real-life. Without this, ‘shared prosperity’, ‘sustainability’, and ‘social well-
being’ will not be possible, because the agents and the interactions needed to fulfil such 
functions would be absent in the analysis. Such undefined social welfare and ISWF should 
perhaps be considered as one of the reasons of social failure observed in Islamic banking.  
This study, therefore, aims to theoretically explore and examine the possibility of developing 
an ISWF within the IME frame by going beyond the traditional fiqhi approach. It focuses on 
issues of preference ordering and utility through the normative dimension of Islamic ontology, 
as expressed and articulated within the IME. By considering Arrow’s impossibility theorem 
and debate around it, this study uses an Islamic public choice approach and Islamic axioms to 
construct a novel counterargument to add to the overall discourse. Currently, the scattered 
debate on SWF relating to the precepts of Islam remains rooted within the fiqhī approach. This 
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study aims to develop the moral aspects of the ISWF and synthesize them with the fiqhī 
approach, which distinguishes the contribution of this study.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 aims to construct ISWF by referring to 
its constituents, which locates it within IME, while Section 4 provides a discussion and 
conclusion. 
2. The Conceptualization of Social Welfare Function through Islamic Moral Economy  
As expressions of neoclassical economics and neoliberal policies, market economies have 
fallen short in their attempt to meet expectations about improving people’s well-being, 
reducing inequality and poverty, and increasing social welfare and economic development (see 
among others: Sen, 1999; Etzioni, 1988). The current imbalance of wealth around the world 
reflects this shortcoming; 70 percent of the world’s total income is concentrated in 20 percent 
of the world’s population (Cummins and Ortiz, 2011: viii). One of the main reasons for this 
poor performance is the denial of any ‘existential’ role for morality in the market economy, 
which has been claimed to be a value-free and ethics-free zone. However, “no human 
endeavour is value-free, which implies that reality, including economic reality, is socially 
constructed” (Asutay, 2007: 3).  
A counterargument proposes that classical economists incorporated ethical concerns into their 
economic understanding. Thus, neoclassicists should follow classical economists in bringing 
ethicality (considerations of morals or principles of morality) into their models (see: Sen, 1982; 
Putnam 2002). Classical economists did emphasize ethicality as part of the voluntarily selected 
economic activities—in contrast to the concept of morality, which necessitates norms and 
values to be embedded in the economic system not as an optional activity but as a “right” 
(Asutay, 2012). The “normative economy” is a kind of economy where moral values and norms 
are the driving forces of the whole economy (see: Thompson, 1971; Scott, 1976; Etzioni, 1988; 
Arnold, 2001; Sayer, 2007). Sayer (2007: 262) defines the scope of the moral economy as 
“moral norms and sentiments … structur[ing] and influenc[ing] economic practices, both 
formal and informal.” 
Polanyi (1944) lucidly argues that moral economies were present in economies and societies 
in the era before self-regulated markets. The market exchange was not the sole determinant of 
economic activities; economic and financial activities were also embedded within the norms 
Asutay, M. & Yilmaz, I. (2021) Constituting an Islamic Social Welfare Function: An Exploration through Islamic 




and values of the society and, also, determined by noneconomic factors such as the normative 
world of their respective societies. In addition, traditional economies and societies were also 
based on cooperation, mutuality, reciprocity, and distribution rather than competition in access 
to resources (Polanyi, 1944). However, capitalist societies have spawned a new breed of 
commercial or self-regulated market design in which fictitious commodities have been created 
through commoditization. Thus, there is a need, according to Polanyi (1944), to “re-embed 
economy in society” and to “de-commodificate labour, land and money.” 
The IME is considered as another aspect of the Polanyian countermovement to re-embed the 
economy to ensure the dignity and interest of all stakeholders and the fair distribution of 
resources so that iḥsān (beneficence) can prevail in defining a good society. The substantive 
morality suggested by Islam goes beyond the narrow definition of “efficiency-oriented 
economics”. This broadening of scope highlights the distinction between Islamic economics 
and the IME.1 
In sharp contrast to the neoclassical value-free notion of economics, which is bounded with the 
behavioural postulate of homoeconomicus, the IME posits homoIslamicus, an individual whose 
behavioural norms remain the same as a Muslim regardless of the political, economic, and 
social spheres. That is, homoIslamicus lives a life without dichotomy, in which there is no 
separation in the form of divine and non-divine or profane and sacred. This non-dichotomous 
fusion also considers the life here and the hereafter as part of the same sphere (Reda, 2013), 
implying that utility and SWFs are continuous. The IME sees homo Islamicus as a “socio-
tropic, God-conscious and hereafter concerned” individual, who seeks to employ “intra-and 
intergenerational social justice…with the aim of forming an authentic Muslim identity as 
opposed to global dominance of capitalism” (Asutay, 2007: 3). By doing so, the individual 
utility function aims to reach falāḥ2 in this world and akhirah in the next and optimize social 
welfare by expanding iḥsān in society. 
 
1 Since the term, economics, is already a neoclassical construct that has been subjected to serious backlashes by 
Islamic scholars, concatenating “Islam” and “economics” -as “Islamic economics” suggests- produces a 
conceptual inconsistency with Islamic teachings since Islamic economic model would seem otherwise as one of 
the variants of Western economics. Therefore, it is more convenient to use IME in responding to the aspirational 
socioeconomic goals of Islam in line with ‘iqtisad’ conceptualisation (Al-Hasani, 2003). 
2 The importance of the process of falāḥ can be appreciated by looking at the words of the adhan, the call to 
prayer. One of the calls in the adhan, “Hasten to falāḥ (real success/salvation)” is repeated five times a day to 
invite individuals to falāḥ. 
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The overriding objective of the IME is to develop a falāḥ process through iḥsāni social capital, 
which is primarily concerned with upgrading the level of well-being of every member of 
society. Within such a process, “distributive justice” (Naqvi, 1981), harmonious growth 
(tazkiyah), and human falah is achieved, as Islamic norms and values harmonize the actions 
and behaviour of all agents in the society. 
2.1. Theoretical foundation 
In an IME, wealth is generated through cooperation and mutuality (El-Gamal, 2007), in 
contrast to the capitalist perspective that necessitates competition and rivalry for the creation 
and sustenance of wealth. Islam disapproves of the accumulation of wealth in the hands of a 
few, which results mainly from capitalist desires; instead, it concentrates primarily on the 
refinement of the “least privileged group in society” (ur-Rahman, 1974: 8). Under this 
operational framework, “wealth keeps on circulating continuously among the people and does 
not unnecessarily accumulate at any particular point” (ur-Rahman, 1974: 9).  
The whole objective of generating a fair distribution of wealth is to reach falāḥ (salvation) in 
this world and the akhirah (hereafter). The falāḥ process requires the maximization of iḥsāni 
(benevolent) social capital in society. Iḥsān oriented behaviour promotes the well-being of each 
member of society, which, in return, leads to social welfare. The objective of ISWF is thus to 
maximize iḥsān among people.  
One of the distinct features of Islamic social welfare is that “the Divine Law emphasizes 
primarily the right (i.e. just) distribution of the benefits of collective action rather than the 
maximization of the flow of such benefits through whatever means” (Naqvi, 1983: 21). This 
contrasts with the conventional economic paradigm in the sense that the exclusive goal of 
economics is “maximization”, irrespective of the righteousness of the means for achieving its 
welfare statement. Islam, however, monitors how wealth is acquired and for which purpose it 
is used, concerning itself with the legitimacy of both means and ends (Pramanaik, 1993: 35).  
The preference ordering of Islam is determined not merely by economic variables; 
noneconomic variables also play a substantial role in shaping this ordering (Choudhury 1986: 
112). The vital concept of akhirah, for instance, affects individuals’ preference orderings by 
requiring them to examine their noneconomic choices. Welfare is conceptualized concerning 
both this world and the hereafter.  
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Zarqa (1980) develops an SWF by including non-economic variables such as taqwá (God 
Consciousness) and akhirah, which has two components. The first is the attainment of what 
Al-Ghazali, and later Al-Shatibi set out as the three objectives, which are “necessities, 
conveniences, and refinements”. The second is providing “a set of rules of precedence which 
helps to resolve conflicts among different social objectives. The two components together make 
up the SWF” (Zarqa, 1980: 13-15). 
Islam, thus, supports a social welfare model that aims at improving individuals’ material well-
being, while leading them to the attainment of “spiritual uplift” (Chapra, 1979: 9). As the latter 
aims at emancipating and empowering individuals to become ‘doing’ and ‘functional’ in the 
way of ‘becoming ihsani’ (Asutay, 2007, 2012, 2018) or tab’ay (embedded) individual as 
defined by Arif (1989). Therefore, as in Zarqa’s understanding of human welfare-oriented 
Islamic economics emerged, in a Polanyian (1944) sense, to rescue human, land, labour, 
capital, environment, and other stakeholders so that human welfare should be achieved along 
with and in line with the welfare of other stakeholders as the tazkiyah and rububiyah axioms 
of IME suggests. 
2.2. Articulating Islamic moral economy 
Islam suggests an axiomatic approach for its economic model. The foundational axioms “[turn] 
an unwieldy catalogue of ethical values [of Islam] into a countable number of axioms, which 
then form an ethical system” (Naqvi, 2003: 149). The axioms articulate the moral obligations 
of the institutions of the IME. This ethics-based approach sets Islamic economics apart from 
conventional economics. 
Some leading scholars, such as Naqvi (1981, 1983, 1994, 2003), Chapra (1992), and Ahmad 
(1994) have proposed constituting axioms of Islamic economics, and Asutay (2012, 2013) has 
developed and extended them. These demonstrate the distinctive nature of the ISWF within the 
IME paradigm, which are explored as follows: 
Tawhid (complementarity and unitarity; the Oneness and Unity of Allah): This axiom clarifies 
“the rules of [the] God-man and man-man relationship” (Ahmad, 1994: 12) and encompasses 
the “vertical dimension” of Islamic ethicality (Naqvi, 1981: 48). Tawhid indicates that Allah 
has created the universe for human beings as an opportunity for spiritual accountability, to 
examine whether their actions conform to the Qur’ānic teachings, leading to akhirah. Thus, 
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individuals do not have absolute freedom in their choices. Instead, with the limited information 
they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the finite amount of time they have to 
make a decision (bounded rationality), they are guided to choose the option that is in line with 
Islamic norms and values, until then they reach falāḥ in this world and akhirah in the hereafter. 
Importantly, this axiom suggests that individuals are equal in their distance to Allah, regardless 
of their gender, nationality, race, wealth, or other identifiers. Therefore, they have equal access 
to the resources created by Allah for them and interest of all the stakeholders should be 
considered equal (Asutay, 2018). Their equality in the sight of the Creator, and their 
complementarity and unity of purpose in the falāḥ process, have important ramifications for 
the nature of the social contract that underlies social justice and social welfare. Hence, tawhid 
provides the mainframe both ontologically and in terms of policy for the ISWF. 
Al‘adl wal iḥsān (justice and excellence) reflects the “horizontal dimension of equity” 
(Sirageldin, 1995: 464). Recognizing the ascendancy of Allah, it eschews any system that 
engenders a hierarchical classification among individuals. Taqwá is the only distinguishing 
feature that differentiates people in the akhirah. In line with these considerations, Islam 
encourages people to establish justice in society. This equilibrium is achieved not only through 
arrangements at the institutional level but also by introducing iḥsāni social capital, which 
encourages and spreads beneficence so that an equilibrium can be maintained in the society 
through sharing economy. In so doing, “high levels of good life (hayyat-al-tayyebah), both 
individual and collective” are achieved (Ahmad, 2003: 193). 
The existence of al’adl necessitates an environment where all human beings have equal 
opportunities in terms of accessing and acquiring material and nonmaterial goods (Asutay, 
2018). However, this particular definition of justice does not contradict the practical fact of the 
diversity of individuals’ initial levels of well-being and capabilities; Allah tests every 
individual in this world with some deprivation of resources and capabilities to entitle them to 
get an eternal life in the akhirah—where no deprivation and incapability exist, and where 
individuals are rewarded as promised and articulated in the Qur’ān.  
It should also be noted that the Islamic concept of social justice suggests two directions for an 
individual’s attitudes, “forming a unity whose spiritual aspirations cannot be separated from 
his bodily desires, and whose spiritual needs cannot be divorced from his material needs” 
(Qutb, 1976: 126). 
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Another constituting axiom is tazkiyah (purification plus growth), which refers to the growth 
and purification of attitudes and relationships—with Allah, with other fellow individuals, with 
the natural environment, with society, and with the state (Asutay, 2007, 2012), which all are 
considered stakeholders, working together for common ends. What makes tazkiyah distinct 
from conventional growth is that tazkiyah requires harmonious growth in all institutions 
(political, economic, social) so that an improvement in one sector of society does not lead to 
the violation of another. Therefore, the IME aims at sustainable and inclusive growth to 
eliminate imbalances in society; it does not allow non-harmonious development. 
Rububiyah (directing things for their perfection), as an axiom, reiterates that everything in the 
world is created with perfection as part of its fitrah (law of nature). Therefore, each person in 
society should be given the opportunity to pursue his or her respective path to develop in 
accordance with the fitrah process. In terms of sustainability, this axiom suggests enabling 
individuals, society, and the natural environment so that they can reach their perfection. Thus, 
the aim of the ISWF is to integrate the expected opportunity space of each stakeholder. 
As for ikhtiyār (free will), Islamic philosophy attaches partial freedom to an individual in 
his/her choices, as opposed to the absolute freedom of Western philosophy. Islam allows 
individuals any alternative or any path to follow, but the consequences of choosing the right or 
wrong path are also the individual’s responsibility (Chapra, 1979). Individuals, as khulafa’ 
(plural for khalīfah) in this world, know that only Allah has perfect knowledge, so when making 
choices, they acknowledge that they need Allah’s guidance to choose the best alternative. Thus, 
individuals should decide accordingly, even if their personal views are in conflict with the 
resulting situation. 
Amanah (trust) emphasizes that everything belongs to Allah; no individual has absolute 
ownership. Individuals, as khulafa’ in this world, act as trustees and use the trust of Allah 
(amanah) to reconstruct institutions that do not conform to the Objectives of Islam. The 
appropriate use of trust contributes to both self-development and social development. This 
insight also differs from the conventional view of private ownership, which bestows absolute 
possession over goods (Chapra, 1992: 207). 
With regards to khalīfah (vicegerency), conventional economics treats human nature as if 
“human beings are … passive and helpless; they have no mission for life” (Chapra 1992: 204). 
However, Islam has expectations for individuals to revitalize existing institutions concerning 
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the objectives of Islam. Therefore, every Muslim, as part of the ummah, has the chief 
responsibility to develop these institutions both for his or her own well-being as well as social 
welfare. While doing so, he or she pursues amanah as Allah’s representative on earth (Asutay, 
2012, 2013) and endeavours to inculcate distributive justice. Thus, this axiom suggests 
solidarity among people through social accountability, in their role as vicegerents of Allah. 
Ukhuwah (solidarity) axiom can best be summarized by the following hadith or the saying of 
the Prophet Muhammad: “The Believers, in their mutual love, mercy, and compassion, are like 
one body: if one organ complained, the rest of the body develops a fever” (Sahih Al-Bukhari, 
Sahih Al-Muslim). Islam directs its adherents to work together to build a social fabric to fashion 
an authentic Muslim identity. Every member of the Muslim ummah acts with solidarity, 
irrespective of gender, race, wealth, and so on. Acting with solidarity, in an Islamic sense, 
generates cooperation and guarantees the safety of other’s well-being. Iḥsān is considered an 
essential aspect of the individual objective function in the sense that individuals striving for 
falāḥ should also aim at helping others attain falāḥ; this results in the creation of iḥsāni social 
capital. IME suggests that achieving human well-being can be possible by expanding iḥsān as 
social capital. 
In summary, individuals’ initial level of well-being is not the primary concern; instead, 
establishing fairness and equity of distribution among individuals must be prioritized to locate 
social justice at the centre of an individual’s behaviour and societal relations. The question of 
whether “absolute” justice can be achieved through equitable distribution is irrelevant because 
the establishment of absolute justice can be attributed only to Allah, who treats and reciprocates 
individual human beings with absolute justice as an outcome of everyone’s actions in this 
world. For this reason, everyday life requires a never-ending search for betterment 
(“becoming”), irrespective of considering whether this betterment can be achieved (Asutay, 
2018). However, this search for betterment does not place individuals in a passive position 
concerning social justice; rather, it requires every individual, one by one, to become an active 
leader (khalīfah) of it. Thus, the strengthening of social justice hinges entirely on individuals’ 
recognition and fulfilment of their khalīfah role (Asutay, 2013, 2018). By doing so, they expect 
to be rewarded in the akhirah or reach falah in this world and the hereafter. 
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2.3. Islamic social welfare function: Fiqhī construct and frame 
The epistemological basis of the ISWF is two pronged: fiqhī construction is concerned with the 
form, and the moral construction is concerned with the substance. The nine axioms described 
are the foundations of the moral construct.   These two approaches complement each other; a 
failure in the fulfilment of any aspect of either one necessarily makes the ISWF incomplete. 
This section first explores the fiqhī construction because this has been the main approach 
covered in the literature. It makes a special reference to Hallaq’s (2002) work.  It then 
concentrates on how the axioms should play a pivotal role in the moral construction to complete 
the ISWF. The discussion presents a novel attempt to demonstrate the possibility of 
establishing an ISWF through well-functioned axioms by endogenizing the moral dynamics of 
the IME. 
The IME gives strength to the establishment of an ISWF within which Muslims as khulafa and 
trustees of Allah can rejuvenate the world in the light of Islamic goals. A proper ISWF that 
fulfils this objective is not treated as the end itself, but rather as the means to achieve falāḥ. 
This intermediary role constitutes the main characteristic that differentiates it from other types 
of SWFs. 
The construction of an ISWF requires the following question to be answered: Can a social 
preference ordering be produced in which an individual’s preferences and values are reflected? 
As explained, Arrow (1963) addressed this objective by concluding that there is no way to 
amalgamate individual preferences to produce a social preference ordering that satisfies all four 
of his axioms. However, an ISWF, with its moral axioms and fiqhī form, can claim the 
possibility of making such an augmentation by definition. 
The fiqhī tool plays an important role since it pins down the boundaries for the individual 
behavioral norm. In this sense, it functions like bounded rationality in the IME framework. An 
ISWF that puts the individual at its center must construct a fiqhī basis together with the moral 
aspect to produce the maximization of social welfare that is acceptable to Islam. Hallaq (2002: 
104) attempts such a construct through a fiqhī approach that classifies individual actions 
according to five ordinances: 
(i)  wajib (W) – Mandatory – ‘must do’;   
(ii)  mandub (Ma) – Recommended – ‘should do’;   
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(iii)  mubāḥ (Mu) – Permissible – ‘may do’; 
(iv)  makrūh (M) – Undesirable – ‘should not do’;   
(v) harām (H) – Prohibited – ‘must not do’.   
Accordingly, the available set of alternatives for an individual to choose from is:  
U=U (W, M, Ma, Mu, H),  
where U stands for a universal set.  
Hallaq (2002: 104) restricts individual choices to three options: Ma, Mu, and M. Because, he 
thinks that Islam attributes no choice for the remaining actions, which are either prohibited (H) 
or mandatory (W). He further suggests that recommended (Ma) and undesirable (M) actions are 
also bounded, in the sense that in certain circumstances, they can be replaced with mandatory 
(W) and prohibited (H) actions. In sum, four of the five categories are bounded actions. 
Therefore, the only mubāḥ remains as a set. Hallaq (2002: 104) considers this set unbounded 
because it “is the only part of the domain that individuals can choose freely.” 
With this premise, Hallaq (2002: 112) concludes that the Arrowian condition of unrestricted 
domains still does not hold in constructing an ISWF because the feasible sets of actions are 
restricted to three sets, initially, and then finally to one. He prefers concentrating on only the 
set of potentially permissible (mubāḥ) actions. Thus, there is no longer a restricted domain.  
In this way, Hallaq (2002) suggests a reconciliation that brings the domain into conformity 
with Arrow’s unrestricted domain assumption. While appreciating the fact that Arrow’s axioms 
are not the ultimate conditions for establishing an ISWF, it is nevertheless noteworthy that 
Muslims do have a choice even concerning wajib and ḥarām activities, contrary to Hallaq’s 
views. Although Islam suggests the right path to follow, individuals are allowed to make their 
own choices, as the axiom ikhtiyār indicates. Allah tests every individual in this world. People 
must comply with this test in return for taking responsibility for the consequences of their 
choices. What is impermissible for Muslims does not mean it is also not feasible for them. 
Consequently, according to Hallaq (2002), the ISWF does not hold the restricted domain 
assumption. 
Hallaq (2002: 112) attempted to reformulate Arrow’s conditions by introducing the 
‘Islamically imposed axiom’, which he interprets as adherence to the Islamic tradition, who 
assumes that this axiom could preclude what Arrow refers to as the dictatorial solution because 
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“the compromises in a public issue in a Muslim community would be easier, since therein 
behaviour is governed by certain values and religious beliefs, such that individuals do not 
consider themselves an isolated unit of the community” (Hallaq, 2002: 122). However, even 
the addition of this assumption is not seen as sufficient for the construction of an ISWF based 
on Arrow’s postulates. Hallaq (2002) therefore prefers approaching the problem along the lines 
of Buchanan (1954), arguing that for a Muslim society, “it is more important to focus on the 
process by which the community is willing to reach a social choice that is consistent with 
Islamic values, more than worrying about the nature of the function itself” (Hallaq, 2002: 114). 
This paper argues that such a process can be achieved only by completing the system with 
ethical norms through IME, as discussed in the following sections. 
2.4. The moral complementary of the fiqhī construction of the Islamic SWF 
Hallaq (2002) argues for the possibility of an ISWF through the satisfaction of Arrow’s 
conditions. He approaches the problem with a fiqhī method by constructing five ordinances for 
the basis of an ISWF. He does not deal with the moral aspect but gradually introduces the 
Islamically imposed axiom as the reflection of the moral dimension. Since the available fiqhī 
construct does not explicitly state that it is also morally acceptable—although it does determine 
the behavioural norms—there is a need to reconsider the five ordinances as the layers of 
preferences.  Otherwise, the problem could degrade merely to the individual level and lack 
consideration of the societal implications; this would produce a partial solution concerning the 
construction of ISWF. 
Looking carefully at the five layers of preferences, it should first be acknowledged that mandub 
(Ma), mubāḥ (Mu), or makrūh (M) activities do not have an absolute priority over another 
concerning the ordering of preferences. Even harām (H) and wajib (W) sets are subject to 
differing preferences during their ordering process. The determinations as to which sets are 
incorporated into the social preference ordering first and which are disregarded depend upon 
the conformity of the chosen set to the aspirations of the IME, which are subject to differ with 
context and time-space factors. Therefore, as Batabyal (2012: 375) refers Binder (2010) 
stresses, “individual preferences can be both context-dependent and time-varying”, which give 
rise to ordering social preference by accounting for these factors, rather than stereotyping a 
certain ordering. 
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An Islamic social preference ordering should, therefore, be established by prioritizing some 
sets over others through the application of moral filtering. This filtering system might not 
necessarily deduce an ordering in line with the fiqhī ordering of these five layers since, in some 
circumstances, Mu activities may be preferred to Ma activities, or M activities to Mu activities, 
or any such combination that results in a better social welfare position.  
At this point, the choice of one set over another for the construction of social preference 
ordering must address the maṣlaḥah (general welfare) criterion, which goes beyond the form-
based understanding of the Qur’ān. According to this criterion, the layers are ordered and 
prioritized by considering their benefits to society and their avoidance of mafsada (harm). 
However, it should also be noted that there is no room for maṣlaḥah in the explicit commands 
of the Qur’ān (nass). The general view of Islam, in this respect, is that “everything that lapses 
out from justice into injustice, and from mercy into its opposite, and from maṣlaḥah to 
mafsadah, and from wisdom into the frivolous, does not belong to shari‘ah, even if it is 
inducted into it by interpretation (ta’wil)”, as Ibn al-Qayyim states (quoted in Siddiqi 2007: 6). 
The application of a form-based approach to the Qur’ān, in this respect, comprises a partial 
solution for the social preference ordering. 
The adaption of consequentialism (the doctrine that the morality of an action is to be judged by 
its consequences as well as its intentional limits) suggested by the IME adds an orientation 
toward substance for the ISWF. Thus, a behavioural norm that is compliant with the form and 
process nature of Shari’ah cannot, at the same time, guarantee its rightfulness unless 
consequences of this behaviour are included in the analysis. The moral aspect, as a parameter 
for rightfulness, complements the fiqhī base with an examination of the entire decision-making 
process. Many examples abound in the real world. The Islamic finance industry, for instance, 
has many operations that are not in conflict with the textual understanding of economic verses 
of Qur’ān. However, these operations, including tawarruq, murābaḥah, and ijārah, although 
ḥalāl (permissible), by definition, do not conform well to the spirit of Islam in terms of their 
substance and consequences. Therefore, something that is ḥalāl from the fiqhī standpoint may 
not be put into the social preference ordering or should not be preferred to another activity that 
is more in the spirit of Islam. In a similar vein, the integration of morality with fiqh requires 
equal treatment to two different situations that are equally harmful. In this context, the IME 
understanding must respond in the same way to a ribawi (interest-based) contract as to a non-
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ribawi contract if the latter has the same harmful effects as the former in society, even it 
satisfies the formal aspect of Qur’ān.  
To give a contemporary example in illustrating why the fiqhī approach needs to be explicated 
and enhanced by the moral approach, fast food consumption or smoking can be mentioned. 
Although there is no unanimous agreement on whether fast food and cigarettes3 are harām or 
unlawful in fiqh, they should not be included in the social welfare concept because their harmful 
effects—such as obesity and addiction—are directly observable. Therefore, activities like 
making the taste of fast food attractive or opening a fast-food buffet to trade in a ḥalāl way 
should not be introduced in the preference ordering, although they fulfil individual needs and 
tastes. At this point, the IME paradigm suggests considering the concept of tayyeb (pure and 
good) beyond fiqhi definition of lawfulness as a constraint in the preference ordering, since the 
Qur’ān (2: 168) strictly stresses pureness and goodness immediately after lawfulness. Such 
examples demonstrate the vitality of morality while making decisions or deriving a rule for the 
construction of an ISWF.  
The essential filtering of morality, however, is inevitably linked to the Islamic concept of 
bounded rationality. Contrary to the conventional meaning of rationality, the IME emphasizes 
its bounded aspect by stating that any individual action must be in accordance with the shari‘ah. 
Thus, the concept of rationality is both bounded and broadened by incorporating akhirah in the 
form of social accountability, as the construct of the Islamic conception of utility. Pursuing and 
amassing nonmonetary rewards become a part of rational behavior because “the act of sacrifice 
is itself seen as enhancing the individual’s expected welfare” (Naqvi, 1983: 31). This 
understanding is deduced by the farḍ (responsibility), khalīfah, and ukhuwah axioms, which 
necessitate individual, social, and spiritual accountability. Thus, rational behavior cannot be 
reduced to the principle of mere self-maximization (Naqvi, 1994: 56). 
The Islamic concept of rationality, in the social welfare context, does not accept individual 
preferences as “supreme and feeding into the social choice” (Choudhury, 1991: 268). This is 
one of the main features that distinguishes the Islamic public choice construct from the 
Arrowian sense of rationality, which strictly bases the SWF on individual sovereignty. 
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Because the strength and priority of shūrá (consultation and deliberating consent) in the 
decision-making process is articulated in the Qur’ān (42:38), Islamic public choice, in 
constructing an ISWF, also adopts a “Shūrátic decision-making process through [the] ijtihād 
mechanism” (Choudhury, 1980: 9). The shūrátic process involves taking input from 
stakeholders on both sides of all economic transactions and transforming such interactions into 
opportunities to advance the economic, social, and spiritual welfare of the entire society—at 
least in theory. 
The method of social choice, from this perspective, adheres to consensus, but Islamic public 
choice puts ijtihād into the process as well to derive the preference ordering. In this sense, 
Islamic public choice produces a deductive, imposed consensus because shari‘ah already 
determines the framework of shūrátic decision making (Mannan, 1982: 17). It aims to actualize 
the imposed consensus in everyday life. By contrast, the Buchananian framework requires an 
inductive process of engagement to establish consensus. Islamic public choice uses only a 
deductive method—namely ijtihad (legal reasoning)—in terms of deriving rules but uses an 
inductive method in providing the substance of the consensus, in the sense of the social contract 
within the derived rule. 
The shūrátic model for social preference ordering requires representative decision-makers 
khulafa’ who have the responsibility for the consequences of their decisions (Choudhury, 1991: 
259). In deriving social choice in the IME, the representatives khulafa’ act on behalf of 
individuals; thus, the averages of individual preferences are not taken to produce public choice. 
Also, contrary to the conventional form, Islamic public choice does not assign equal weights 
to the preferences, since “the least-privileged people need much priority for establishing 
distributive justice” (Naqvi, 1983: 34-35).  
Arrow’s Pareto condition implies that efficiency is the exclusive condition for the preference 
ordering, irrespective of the concern for equity and justice. These moral considerations are left 
to the market’s self-regulating capabilities; hence, the Pareto principle adopts a stance of 
neutrality about distributional concerns (Naqvi, 2002: 115). Therefore, in Paretian terms, “a 
society or an economy can be optimal … even when some people are rolling in luxury and 
others are near starvation as long as the starvers cannot be made better off without cutting into 
the pleasures of the rich” (Sen 1970: 22).  
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By contrast, the IME, based on consequentialism, assumes that every social preference ordering 
must reveal “right outcomes as well as efficient solutions” (Mannan, 1982: 17). This implies 
that the priority of equality over efficiency is derived from the principle of socioeconomic 
justice or al’adl wal iḥsān of the IME. Although the trade-off between efficiency and equality 
is an indispensable paradox for conventional economics, the IME attributes no conflict between 
them; rather, it points out the “simultaneity” of these two (Choudhury, 1991: 273). 
In exploring and expanding the interaction within the Islamic social welfare framework, 
Choudhury (1991: 267) introduces the principle of “ethical endogeneity”, which is similar to 
Rawls’ (1972) notion of “reflective equilibrium”: working back and forth among our 
considered judgments as we reflect on and revise our beliefs about an area of inquiry, moral or 
amoral. This implies that: “there is an intrinsic two-way relationship between polity (policy 
variables) and the market system (state variables) in an ethicoeconomic order. In such 
interrelationships, both policy variables and state variables feedback upon each other in a 
dynamic labyrinth of social transformations. Such a property of the polity-market interaction 
generates locally, but not globally, stable solutions for state and policy variables in an 
ethicoeconomic general equilibrium system” (Choudhury, 1991: 267). 
In the IME framework, socioeconomic justice requires an inclusive growth process (tazkiyah). 
Thus, polity-market interactions must be in harmony with one another.  This makes Western-
type SWF impossible, as can be seen in Arrow’s impossibility theorem. The failure of Western 
economic thought concerning explicit growth policies emanates from the lack of such 
endogeneity. 
By contrast, through the endogeneity derived from the tawhidi framework—which determines 
the individual-individual, individual-environment, and individual-Allah relationships—
individual preferences can be ordered, and these preferences can be amalgamated without 
contradiction. Individual-individual relations are determined by the al’adl wal iḥsān, ukhuwah, 
and khalīfah axioms within the tawhidi paradigm and according to the shūrátic process, in 
which every individual promotes his/her well-being without a violation of others, and also aims 
to promote the well-being of others according to his/her constraints. Individual-environment 
relations are concerned with the development of both intra- and intergenerational justice and 
the iṣlāḥ (reform) of old institutions. This requires a “continuous reproduction [of resources]” 
in lieu of searching for an optimal resource allocation within a competitive environment 
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(Choudhury, 2009: 225). As for individual-Allah relations, the two-way relationship between 
Allah and the individual forms the ontological basis for an ISWF.  
With this insight, individual consciously makes preference orderings in line with the Qur’ānic 
teachings, which necessitate the consideration for the akhirah, for individual’s mission in this 
world through khalīfah and for individual’s conscience of his role as trustee of Allah in the 
meaning of amanah within the Tawhidi paradigm and shuratic process. These three 
relationships under the umbrella of foundational axioms should be considered as the 
constituents of the ISWF; at the same time, they correspond to the implications of Hallaq’s 
(2002) five ordinances. This correspondence addresses the moral complementary of the fiqhī 
construction of the ISWF. 
The Pareto condition and unrestricted domain assumptions do not hold in the ISWF. The 
unrestricted domain assumption is needed because individual preferences are assigned 
“different weights, and some have zero weights” (Naqvi, 1994: 66). However, considered in 
terms of the five layers of individual preferences, there are no restrictions on the domain; 
instead, there is a filtering mechanism through the shūrátic process.  
The non-dictatorship assumption of Arrow, on the other hand, holds in the ISWF because the 
al’adl wal iḥsān (horizontal equity) axiom rejects the enforcement of choice of any one 
individual on the rest. Historically, there has been an explicit tendency by adherents of 
neoclassicism to assume that the state is exogenous and a mostly neutral benevolent factor. 
Hence, from the neoclassical point of view, constructing an SWF implicitly necessitates the 
attribution of the state as an omniscient dictator. The impossibility of developing an SWF based 
on Arrow’s assumptions can be circumvented only by introducing a benevolent state in which 
the social preference ordering is assumed to be established by state organs, and this ordering 
serves for the refinement of every individual. Muslim scholars, on the other hand, usually 
assume an endogenized benevolent state.  
The IME approach rejects both these views. It suggests giving up this idealized view of state 
because the state is constituted by individuals, and individuals, by definition, have a normative 
way of approaching issues. This view is antagonistic to the understanding of the state as an 
organic entity. Thus, the IME’s response to the state-oriented solution to Arrow’s theorem 
should be that the impossibility can be removed only by considering the state, in Downs’ (1957) 
terms, “as a working part of the economy, not a force external to it” (Orchard and Stretton, 
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1997: 410). By introducing morality as a parameter into the model, the ISWF requires that 
some conditions of the Arrowian SWF be modified or rejected. 
3. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper explores the theoretical possibility of constituting an ISWF that does not necessarily 
have to fulfil Arrow’s conditions by arguing for different ontological and epistemological base. 
In this regard, IME suggests an axiomatic approach through the norms, values, and principles 
of Islamic ontology, intending to create a human-centred development process. Achieving 
social justice and social good through the essentialisation of iḥsāni process and the expansion 
of iḥsāni social capital remains the essence of this paradigm. However, in the conventional 
economic understanding of social welfare, biases in the welfare maximization of different 
classes is a major problem. For instance, one of the rationales behind formulating SDGs mainly 
stems from the fact that short-run economic development strategies and policies successively 
pursued by developed nations in the post-war era have resulted in developmentalist failure in 
the long-run due to the temporality of these achievements and the temptation of short-run profit 
maximisation blurring the reality of slowing down of economy signalling a serious catastrophe 
in the future. Islamic social welfare conception, however, envisages tazkiyah understanding, 
which requires harmonious growth in all institutions (political, economic, social) so that an 
improvement in one sector of society does not lead to the violation of another.  Thus, an SWF 
based on the IME has distinctive characteristics as compared to alternative SWFs based on the 
prevailing neoclassical postulates. It is important to note that the distinction put forward by this 
paper is based on the articulation of IME as opposed to the traditional treatment of the subject 
through a fiqhi approach developed by Islamic economics. 
The concept of iḥsān plays a substantial role in the construction of SWF and individual well-
being within the IME frame. The ultimate goal of all human beings that is, the ultimate 
objective of the utility function is to achieve Allah’s consent. Efforts to attain this goal must 
encompass the falāḥ process through the accumulation of iḥsāni social capital. Self-interested 
motives, rationality, and “egoistic welfare-maximizing calculus as the ideal type of economic 
behavior” (Naqvi, 1983: 29) do not contribute to the accumulation of iḥsāni social capital. 
Islam, therefore, strongly recommends taking responsibilities (farḍ) and becoming vicegerents 
(khalifa) of Allah to embed iḥsān among members of society. This is considered to be the only 
Asutay, M. & Yilmaz, I. (2021) Constituting an Islamic Social Welfare Function: An Exploration through Islamic 




way for human beings to achieve falāḥ in this world and the akhirah. The pursuit of the ISWF, 
in this sense, is an important means for human beings to complete the falāḥ process. 
The foundational axioms aim to create an individual type (homo Islamicus) to revive the old 
institutions. But the critical point is that Muslims are in a state of “becoming”; they are not 
compelled to reach the homo Islamicus or most correctly tab’ay (embedded or surrendered) 
individual (Arif, 1989)  state as an individual as long as they struggle in the process to attain 
this state. Thus, in the process sense, Islam does not adhere to a consequentialist approach. 
However, in terms of content, consequentialism is essential to ensure the substance of the 
process; it is content that ensures that the process of “becoming” is robust.  
Within the Islamic framework, the Islamic fiqhī method of categorization embodies all possible 
ordinances with which individuals may construct their preference orderings. Each individual’s 
ordering of preferences within the universal set, however, is not definite; each ordinance can 
have superiority over another in certain circumstances. The moral filtering is determined by 
the axiomatic approach of the IME through shūrátic decision making, the falāḥ process, and 
the maṣlaḥah criterion. The application of such a filtering process allows for each preference 
ordering to comply in terms of both substance and consequence with the aspirations of the 
IME—which, in turn, enables a social preference ordering based on an IME to be produced. 
The standard fiqhī preference ordering—without the moral filtering that determines a certain 
position for each ordinance in the universal set—may lead to a situation where a social 
preference ordering is impossible to construct, except in the dictatorial solution addressed in 
the Arrowian notion. 
The amalgamation of individual preferences into a social preference ordering becomes possible 
because, with the assumption of homo Islamicus, the application of moral filtering eliminates 
the heterogeneity of individuals’ orderings. This creates an environment where differences in 
individual orderings are minimized and every ordering does not contradict the others—as 
happens in a zero-sum game. As a result, both the individual preference orderings and the 
subsequent social preference ordering work in harmony with the understanding of the Islam 
moral economy. 
The conventional economic system creates inconsistencies in the process of social preference 
ordering as long as it insists on its assumption of being value-free. In responding, a moral 
economy approach contributes to the establishment of a social preference ordering by 
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embedding individual values. The IME, at this point, can contribute to SWF related debate by 
introducing its distinctive features, norms, and values within an Islamic public choice approach. 
This process would embed iḥsān as part of the substantive morality (beyond fiqhī-based 
instrumental morality). The result would be a different social contract, which would require a 
distinct SWF, in the form of an ISWF. Only then can a “balanced and integrated individual 
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